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As clichés go, there’s none better than “Beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder.”
Often this phrase is invoked to reconcile differing value 
judgments between pet owners, fashion designers, or family 
members who simply cannot fathom what you see of aesthetic 
value in another person whose looks fail to impress. But 
among aestheticians and lovers of art, this phrase can provide 
a plausible reason, a convincing rationale, or a failsafe escape 
from artistic disagreement. Locating the source of one’s 
judgment of beauty in the eye of the beholder allows the 
viewer to be the subjective decider. Never mind that the artist 
has intentionally crafted a visual spectacle that embodies or 
expresses objective properties of beauty; let the decision rest 
with the viewer.
When the representation open to judgment is the human 
body—naked or nude (the distinction made emphatically by 
Kenneth Clark in 1956 in his classic book The Nude: A Study 
in Ideal Form)—then interpretation and evaluation become 
more complicated. No longer are we merely following the 
five-part formula of eighteenth-century British empiricists like 
Edmund Burke, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume who 
characterized the supposedly “disinterested” experience of 
beauty as consisting of:
1. Perception
2. Triggered faculty of taste
3. Object with particular properties (of beauty)
4. Resulting in pleasure
5. Yields a pronouncement of “this is beautiful.”
Rather, we are in the realm of contextual analysis: looking at the 
simple fact that many of the most famous nude bodies depicted 
throughout the history of art are those of women, created by 
men, as objects of beauty for us to freely gaze upon: perhaps 
disinterestedly, and perhaps not.1
This presentation will explore and engage the newest mode 
of defiant challenges to that ideal standard of beauty portrayed 
throughout the history of art—the female form—as expressed 
by artist Joel-Peter Witkin in a series of provocative photographs 
from the past ten years. I will narrow the scope considerably, 
to only a few artworks, because they are so complex: choosing 
to focus on three images (plus one of a male nude) that 
involve bodies with disabilities posing, i.e., performing for the 
camera, the photographer, 
and the viewing audience. 
This is basically a paper 
about artistic evaluation and 
how multiple interpretations 
can give rise to inconsistent 
and conflicting meanings. 
Images like Witkin’s First 
Casting for Milo  (2004) 
challenge the viewer to 
look closely, understand 
the formal properties at 
work, and then extract a 
meaning that ultimately asks, 
Is the model exploited or 
empowered? Is Karen Duffy, 
pictured here, vulnerable 
and “enfreaked” or is she 
potent ia l ly  subvers ive, 
transgressive, and perhaps 
self-empowered?
I will offer an argument in agreement with artist/author/
performer Ann Millett-Gallant that favors the latter interpretation, 
but will augment and complicate the issue by also introducing a 
pointed question or two taken from a recent analysis by Cynthia 
Freeland on objectification. I judge the works by photographer 
Joel-Peter Witkin to be representations of disabled persons 
who are empowered through agency and pride, but I also 
worry about the risk of multiple, conflicting interpretations 
on the part of viewers who do not, or cannot, entertain such 
enlightened readings. Like second wave feminist views about 
pornography that depicted women in demeaning ways, or 
feminist critiques of Judy Chicago’s The Dinner Party, Witkin’s 
photos can be judged as potentially offensive. But they are 
also objects of beauty—both in terms of aesthetic properties 
(they are magnificent studies in black and white, shadows, the 
human body, with many classical references) and because of 
the feeling of beauty and pride felt by the posers, who become 
performers of their own beauty and pride. I argue that beauty 
trumps offensiveness. Pride wins. But I’m not sure that everyone 
will agree.
I. Disarming Venus
“Disarming Venus” is not my term but rather the creative 
phrase offered by author Ann Millett-Gallant in her recent 
book, The Disabled Body in Contemporary Art.2 It is the title 
of the first chapter in which she seeks to educate viewers in 
how to “visualize disability” in opposition to canonical erasure 
or more recent trends of casting such bodies in freak shows 
and displays of “otherness.” She cites images by painter Frida 
Kahlo as historical precedents of a woman picturing her own 
body (starting in the 1930s in Mexico) as “broken, wounded, 
and degenerate due to her disabilities.”3 She focuses on self-
portraits that display Kahlo’s “personal and medical body” in 
images of “her numerous miscarriages, surgeries, recoveries, 
and physical degeneration.”
The “self” portrayed in Kahlo’s work emerges as a 
body in pieces—graphically ripped apart, wounded, 
bleeding, and impaled. …Kahlo was ahead of her time 
in her unashamed, graphic, and performative bodily 
displays of disability.4
She cites feminist admirers and the overall popularity of Kahlo—
both as artist and Mexican role model—as she emphatically 
points to the transgressive nature of her performance:
This performance contradicts conventional narratives 
of pity, deficiency, and isolation that characteristically 
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surround disabled women…[she] is portrayed as 
passionate and sensual, rather than corporeally and 
sensorially “lacking” and helplessly dependent.5
Perhaps even more importantly for this session, being sponsored 
by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine, her 
body—boldly on display as a “spectacle” (her preferred term—
serves “as a site, target, and vehicle for ideology and creative 
express ion” within 
disability studies “to 
overturn predominant 
s t e r e o t y p e s  a b o u t 
bodies and norms for 
social acceptability” 
based  on  medica l 
m o d e l s  t h a t  v i e w 
disability as “a set of 
medical and corporeal 
‘problems’” to be cured, 
fixed, or eliminated.6 
The posing of her self 
elevates Kahlo to a 
level of agency and 
activism; she becomes a 
proponent of visualizing 
the disabled that results 
in  the  subvers i ve , 
t r a n s g r e s s i v e 
overturning of traditional 
w e s t e r n  i d e a l s  o f 
feminine beauty (such as those  embodied in the classical 
Venus de Milo) and an example of a new and different sort of 
beauty, namely, one that exudes a concept promoted by the 
Disability Arts and Culture movement and involves what is 
known as disability pride.
This is the thesis of her entire book, as she works through 
numerous examples and argues that disability as socially 
constructed by our culture as abnormal, lacking, other, and 
freak, is wrong. She seeks to correct the readings of visual 
disability through her (admittedly) subjective interpretations of 
bodies on display by contextualizing them within an interpretive 
framework that sees and identifies with the poser/performer 
who chooses to exhibit her disability rather than hide or deny 
it. These posers choose to flaunt their bodily differences in 
resistance to mainstream culture
that teaches disabled people that our success is 
intrinsically tied to the denial of our disabilities and 
our bodies. If we are successful (“able”), we must 
“overcome” our disability—effectively defeat our 
impairments—and become as normal as possible, 
for, we are told, this is the goal.7
This form of self-exhibition is counterintuitive, alarming, 
and even shocking to some viewers. Photographer and disability 
studies theorist David Hevey has suggested that “photography 
‘enfreaks’ disabled people, thus socially and visually constructing 
them as ostracized ‘others’.”8 This is the risk that all visual (and 
perhaps literary) representations run when interpreted by an 
audience who is unlearned in the interpretive framework 
advanced by Millett-Gallant. The question becomes, Is it worth 
the risk of misinterpretation to visually represent disability, 
particularly when the poser feels empowered, beautiful, and 
proud? The same question was once asked about women 
posing in porn designed for the male gaze, as if feminists knew 
better than porn-posers what was empowering and what was 
not. But more recent artworks by women have become more 
transgressive than ever, reproducing the conventions of porn 
while simultaneously parodying them. The lesson of learning 
how to look is a valuable one, if not still controversial.
II. Performance as a Freakish Venus
When Irish artist Karen Duffy posed for the Witkin photograph 
in 2004, she was engaged in a silent performance of disarming 
Venus. Born without arms, Duffy has performed in live artworks 
since 1995 when she posed in the nude, in a self-objectifying 
act where she verbally explained that her body was already 
objectified in society and she was taking control/ taking back 
her dignity—from cultural stereotypes that cast her body as 
shameful, unacceptable, and better left unseen. She becomes 
the anti-idealized body: excessive and taboo. Staged by Witkin 
in seductive lingerie and partially shrouding drapery, she 
also openly performs “as a freakish Venus” who “means to 
intrude upon and liberate herself from histories of oppressive 
representations of women and disabled women specifically.”9 
This is intended to be an exercise of agency by which one’s 
experience of disability becomes a tool toward artistic and 
feminist activism.
Moreover, she parades herself in defiance of a condemning 
medical gaze that has turned disabled bodies into “medical 
curiosities” within a purportedly sanitized, scientific, and 
objective realm. Citing early medical photography in the 
nineteenth to early twentieth century that became a widely 
popular form of entertainment, disabled bodies were displayed 
for paying customers to gawk over with voyeuristic pleasure. 
Millett-Gallant suggests that the photographer, Witkin (who 
studied such early photographs), appropriates the voyeuristic 
and theatrical medical gaze for the purpose of subverting its 
belittling power over such bodies that were forced to recoil 
under view. Humor and Fear, New Mexico is another work 
by Witkin that is cited as accomplishing similar goals. In this 
depiction, the author contends, the poser is “performing 
amputation”: a clear reference to medical vocabulary that 
focuses on the model’s impairments, her hands and particularly 
her right leg. Like 
photographer and 
disability studies
theorist David Hevey 
h a s  s u g g e s t e d 
(that “photography
‘enfreaks’ disabled 
p e o p l e ,  t h u s 
socially and visually 
constructing them as 
freakish, ostracized
‘others’”),  crit ic 
Garland-Thomson 
m a i n t a i n s  t h a t 
fetishization of the 
body and particular 
body parts, derived 
f r o m  m e d i c a l 
models,  “serves 
t o  e c l i p s e  t h e 
multidimensional 
nature of disabled subjects, constructing disability as social 
spectacle.”10 In other words, multiple readings of the body are 
lost in favor of one objectifying, “enfreaking” process by which 
the viewer gazes/stares to see and to know “what happened” 
to cause the abnormality. Upon learning that the model lost 
her limb, as a young woman, due to toxic shock syndrome 
incurred from the use of a tampon, and thus amputated by 
medical procedures, Garland-Thomson’s reading of the body-
as-spectacle construes her in the “role of medical specimen, 
subjected to a diagnostic gaze/stare.”11 Millett-Gallant argues 
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in response that the image “exceeds medical discourse in its 
blatant theatricality” and defies such a predictable, objectifying 
reading. But remember, beauty is in the eye of the beholder; 
with which reading are you more comfortable?
Perhaps, as we quibble over conflicting interpretations, 
it would be good to hear from the model who was reported 
to have said to Peter-Joel Witkin, upon viewing the finished 
photograph “with pride,” that it made her feel beautiful. This 
is Millett-Gallant’s strongest argument for her interpretation but 
it may not be decisive for some viewers who simply cannot 
read the image in that way. It is worth noting that one of my 
students, who weighs 83 pounds and is a force to be reckoned 
with when she enters the classroom in her wheelchair, giggled 
with glee when she saw this photograph and the previous 
one by Witkin. Having studied the works of Frida Kahlo, she 
felt vindicated by contemporary images of the disabled body 
in which she immediately saw (and felt, I presume) a similar 
sense of agency, pride, and beauty. She acted as if the artworld 
had finally caught up with the self-empowerment felt in the 
paintings by Kahlo that were seen as being ahead of their time, 
a harbinger of a more organized disability pride movement. She 
only read them in one way: positive. And she wanted to learn 
more about them.
III. Objectification or Subjectification of Performance/
Posing?
It is worth noting that Millett-Gallant realizes that her 
interpretations are disputable. She always frames the question 
of interpreted meaning in terms of the possibility of the images 
being transgressive. She leaves open the charge of exploitation, 
“enfreakment,” and invites dialogue. Allow me to offer one way 
of extending the discussion, namely, by means of an interesting 
analysis of portraiture offered by Cynthia Freeland, by way of 
Martha Nussbaum. First, consider a third example by Witken of 
a work that “performs amputation”: Portrait of Greg Vaughn.
Here the young, androgynous male body resembles the 
early Greek ideal kouros figure with idealized Classical features. 
But the overdone theatricality and humorous, playful props 
are absent. This young man poses in quite a vulnerable and 
expectant position. As Millett-Gallant observes,
this modern day kouros…is entirely nude (as the body 
is considered in art) and/or naked (as it is considered 
in medical imagery)…the photograph, like Humor 
and Fear, plays with visions of the body with and 
as ornamental objects…[it] not only represents but 
performs amputation, not as a surgical and disarming 
act of removing limbs, but rather as an embodied 
performance of identity…Witkin’s photographic 
performances of amputation dissect the inherent 
contradictions, supposed neutrality, and integrity of 
the medical gaze and medical imagery.12
But do they? Is this how you read this image, as opposed to the 
previous one? Or does the age of the poser and the vulnerability 
of his stance (with his arm leaning on the marble), jeopardize 
the preferred interpretation of an agentic, empowered, proud 
beauty?
A new book by Cynthia Freeland, entitled Portraits and 
Persons: A Philosophical Inquiry, offers an enlightening analysis 
of portraits in terms of personal identity as well as aesthetic 
qualities that focuses in one chapter on the topic of intimacy.13 
Basically, Freeland’s thesis is that portraits are a genre of fine 
art that express (1) physical individuality and recognizability, 
(2) an inner life/character/psychological or mental states of the
sitter (poser), and (3) an awareness on the part of both the artist
and subject that they are self-consciously engaged in a process
of depication, thereby 
excluding most animal 
portraiture from the 
definition of the term. 
At one point Freeland 
suggests that the portrait 
subject must actually 
“look back” at the artist, 
allowing him/herself to 
be viewed, in order to be 
a full participant in the 
process of portraiture.14 
I raise this condition 
from Freeland as a 
way of complicating 
the meaning of  the 
per formance of the 
poser in Portrait of Greg 
Vaughan because, unlike 
the previous two photos 
(but like the paintings of 
Frida Kahlo), he looks 
out at the artist and 
viewer. Freeland cites 
Martha Nussbaum’s criteria for objectification as follows:
1. Person P uses person Q as an instrument (means);
2. P denies Q’s autonomy;
3. P treats Q as inert;
4. P treats Q as interchangeable or fungible;
5. P violates Q’s boundaries;
6. P treats Q as something that can be owned;
7. P denies Q’s subjectivity.15
She then constructs her own set of criteria, based
in opposition to Nussbaum, that define what she calls 
“subjectification” that allows for the intimate depiction of a 
sitter in a non-objectified way:
1. Person P treats Q as an end and not a means;
2. P endorses Q’s autonomy;
3. P treats Q as active and alive;
4. P treats Q as unique and irreplaceable;
5. P respects Q’s boundaries;
6. P treats Q as something that cannot be owned;
7. P endorses Q’s subjectivity.16
It is easy to see how Freeland would interpret many so-called 
portraits of nude females in evidence throughout the canon of 
western European art history as objectified according to these 
criteria. But how do Witkin’s photos fare on her analysis?
Millett-Gallant’s informal criterion of agency seems to
replicate conditions (2) - (3), and perhaps (6) - (7). But in looking 
at Portrait of Greg Vaughn, can we decisively say that Witkin 
treats Vaughn as an end and not a means (condition (1)) or 
as unique and irreplaceable (4)? (His uniqueness, indeed his 
humanity, seems threatened by his physical connection to the 
marble support, of which he appears to be a part.) In painting 
the model’s skin a pasty white to resemble the roughly hewn, 
unsculpted marble support, has Witkin respected Vaughn’s 
boundaries (5)? I believe these are difficult questions to answer 
and pose a challenge for Millett-Gallant who is willing to admit to 
competing interpretations of visual disability in art (and disability 
pride), but who repeatedly minimizes them. I do not have time 
to delve into it fully here, but Freeland is much more unsure 
about how to interpret problematic and controversial images; 
she cites, for example, the work of Robert Mapplethorpe 
and the examples that really push people over the edge, the 
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photographs of nude children posed by their mother in rural 
Virginia: photographer Sally Mann.
Is it enough for Mann’s daughter to report, later in life, 
that “we enjoyed being photographed. It gave us a sense of 
beauty”?17 The similarity, in some respects, of Witkin’s Portrait 
of Greg Vaughn and Mann’s Popsicle Drips, is instructive. It alerts 
us to the multiple meanings not only of visual representations of 
boyhood, young men’s bodies, and the depiction of disability, 
but also to the professed voice of the poser/performer whose 
pronouncements might more reasonably be taken with a grain 
of salt. As mentioned earlier, I offer the comparison of these 
photos as a way to extend the dialogue begun by Ann Millett-
Gallant, as it brings together two realms of inquiry—disability 
studies and feminist aesthetics—at the site of very complicated 
images. In re-reading Freeland’s analysis, I sense her difficulty 
and frustration at arriving at clean, decisive readings of the 
photographs of Sally Mann. Aware that subjective responses 
can vary greatly, Freeland argues that some of Mann’s photos 
fail the criteria of subjectification, and she relegates them to the 
realms of objectification instead. Her reaction to the comment 
made by Mann’s daughter, Jesse, in which she conveyed a sense 
of enjoyment and beauty, is none too subtle:
My response to this comment is the same as the 
point made earlier about little girl beauty queens. It 
is difficult to defend the position that their choices to 
participate in competitions that objectify and hyper-
sexualize them at a young age are autonomous. And 
so even if, like Jesse Mann, they comment later on 
that they enjoyed the process, their opinion does not 
cancel out the fact of their objectification. Sally Mann 
is like any other stage mom (or dad) using a child as 
means to an end.18
IV. Millett-Gallant’s Performing Amputation
In this final photo by Joel-Peter Witkin, Ann Millett-Gallant 
herself, the author of the text I have used primarily throughout 
this paper, is performing amputation. Entitled Retablo, New 
Mexico, she is the figure on the right with her back to us in an 
elaborately staged retablo which references Latin American, 
Catholic folk art traditions (and for Millett-Gallant, she notes, 
the works of Kahlo). Witkin was inspired by a retablo image 
of two lesbians embracing, posed above a prayer to San 
Sebastian, thanking him for bringing them together. Witkin’s 
photograph also contains this prayer (at the bottom) and 
is steeped in the European tradition of retablos such as the 
Italian painter Duccio’s painting of Christ resisting Lucifer’s 
temptations (although in Witkin’s, this includes a future of the 
world after the tragedy of 9/11). The principle female nude is 
modeled after Veronica, who gazes down at her lover, Sylvia, 
staged on a pedestal covered in flowing drapery, and includes a 
characteristic St. Sebastian and a skeleton reminiscent of death. 
Even Millett-Gallant summarily states, “I cannot logically explain 
the photograph, as it defies a central narrative. It is far more 
sensory than sensible,” but she is quick to proffer that she felt 
no embarrassment disrobing, removing her prosthesis, being 
painted white, and being posed.19 She concludes her book with 
this image, sharing her thoughts with us:
I have my back to the camera and am seated on my 
two shorted legs (one congenitally amputated above 
the knee and one below), as I extend my “deformed,” 
or here fabulist/fabulous arms. The female figures are 
opposing in the positions—one flaunting the front of 
her nude body, the other much smaller and flaunting 
her back. The two bodies complement one another 
and complete a disfigured, heavenly narrative. Witkin 
said he especially, aesthetically admired my back, 
which inspired the pose. This seated figure that is me 
is magical and all-powerful; as viewers stare at my 
back, I stare back. Like the other models in this book, I 
perform for my readers/viewers. Life becomes art.20
I  l e a v e  t h e  f i n a l 
analysis, interpretation, and 
evaluation up to you. Does 
performing amputation 
embody agency, pride, 
and beauty? Or is it an ill-
conceived exploitation 
of one’s vulnerability? I 
would suggest that there 
are multiple interpretations 
to ponder here and that 
perhaps the more we 
consider, the richer the 
discussion will be. I look 
forward to the discussion 
in the hopes that we can 
discern even more nuanced 
criteria for a concept of 
“disability pride” and the 
natural correlative of that 
concept, one which has so far remained unnamed: the concept 
of disability beauty.
Endnotes
1. My favorite Burke quote always seemed to reveal more desire 
than disinterest: “observe that part of a beautiful woman 
where she is perhaps the most beautiful, about the neck 
and breasts: the smoothness; the softness; the easy and 
invisible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the 
smallest space the same; the deceitful maze, through which 
the unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing where to 
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other stage mom (or dad) using a child a  means to an end. 18
IV. Millett-Gallant’s Performing Amputation
Joel-Peter Witkin. Retablo, New Mexico (2007). Catherine Edelman Gallery, Chicago.
In this final photo by Joel-Peter Witkin, Ann Millett-Gallant herself, the author of the text 
I have used primarily throughout this paper, is performing amputation. Entitled Retablo, New 
Mexic , she is the figure on the right with her back to us in an elaborately staged retablo which 
references Latin American, Catholic folk art traditions (and f r Millett-Gallant, she note , the 
works of Kahlo). Witkin was inspired by a retablo image of two lesbians embracing, posed 
above a prayer to San Sebastian, thanking him for bringing them together. Witkin’s photograph 
also contains this prayer (at the bottom) and is steeped in the European tradition of retablos such 
Joel-Peter Witkin. Retablo, New 
Mexico (2007). Catherine Edelman 
Gallery, Chicago.
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Disability, Internalized Oppression, and 
Appearance Norms
Sara Goering
University of Washington
Whether disabled or not, people who do not meet appearance 
norms often feel intense pressure to use available medical 
interventions to “fix” their appearance. Feminists have critiqued 
the practice of cosmetic surgery given its complicity with sexist 
norms of appearance and standards of beauty.1 In disability 
studies circles, the pressure to adhere to norms of species-
typical functioning has also been widely criticized.2 Should 
such criticisms extend to practices and medical interventions 
designed to help people achieve species-typical appearance 
norms? In this paper, I argue that they should, but with certain 
caveats. Namely, the criticism of species-typical functioning is 
not so much a problem with the attempt to help people achieve 
the norms as such, but rather the social, institutional, and 
contextual features that make that offer very difficult to resist, 
and that simultaneously denigrate the worth of the individual as 
she is without typical functioning. In a world in which disabled 
people were widely valued and respected for their abilities, 
some individuals might well prefer to use medical technologies 
or other interventions to attempt to achieve typical functioning. 
But not all would, and we could perhaps be more confident that 
what motivated individuals who did desire such change would 
not be a sense that they could not be complete or valued without 
it. Similarly, in the case of interventions to achieve normal 
appearance, what matters most, morally speaking, is not that 
an intervention aims at producing a particular look, but rather 
the relative ease of acceptance of the individual regardless of 
whether she gets the intervention, and the ways that social 
practices can constrain her alternatives.
In this paper, I focus on how pressures to achieve 
appearance norms align with similar and troubling pressures to 
meet functioning and beauty norms, and how such pressure can 
undermine or diminish individual autonomy. Put another way, 
I’m less interested in what the particular aimed-for appearance 
is, and more interested in what motivates a person to seek it. 
As a secondary point, though, I think we need to be aware of 
how social expectations shift in accordance with what many 
individuals do, even if each individual does so autonomously, 
and they do not aim for a collective end. When many people 
seek surgery to enhance their looks, they exacerbate pressures 
on others to meet similar standards.
Cosmetic surgery is a relatively widely accepted practice 
that still raises the hackles of many feminists. In philosophical 
debates over its moral acceptability, criticisms sometimes focus 
on how autonomous choices for cosmetic surgery really are. 
That is, although women certainly can be said to “choose” 
such surgery, and even sometimes adamantly insist that they 
are doing it for themselves (not for anyone else, or due to any 
troubling interference), critics have expressed concern about 
two possibilities: 1) that such women don’t have sufficient 
alternatives, at least with respect to maintaining their social 
status, given sexism in society; 2) that such women may have 
internalized oppression that undercuts the apparent authenticity 
of their choice. When people act within unduly constrained 
circumstances (“your money or your life” spoken at gunpoint is 
obvious coercion; “get a face lift or lose your broadcasting job” 
may similarly be coercive, even if it is not directly threatened 
but clearly understood), or when they accept norms that 
denigrate them, learning to see themselves as problematic or 
of lesser value than others, we need to pay close attention to 
how much weight we give their individual decisions in terms 
of their responsibility and our duty to respect their autonomy. 
Saying “she knew what she was getting into, and she chose it” 
seems troubling if a woman who gets cosmetic surgery deeply 
felt that she could not be acceptable or employable without 
it. It sets an overly narrow scope on the moral dimensions of 
the issue at hand. Instead, the widespread use of cosmetic 
surgery, particularly by women, means that we need to attend 
to the broader social forces—such as continuing oppression 
of women—that constrain women’s action and may undercut 
their senses of self.3 Sexism in norms of appearance hasn’t gone 
away, despite the efforts of third wave feminists to try to seize 
control of our ideas of beauty and appearance.
Our reasons for questioning the sexist norms of appearance 
underlying the use of cosmetic surgery may also be reasons 
for questioning the norms of appearance that motivate people 
with visible bodily abnormalities (e.g., facial “wine stains,” cleft 
palate, atypical limb growth, scars from burns or trauma) to seek 
to “correct” their appearance. That is, we should also be asking 
whether or not such individuals have sufficient alternatives 
to treatment (or do they feel unduly pressured to receive 
treatment?), and is their choice among alternatives possibly 
the result of internalized oppression? In what follows, I will 
explore how norms of appearance influence decisions about 
medical interventions for people with visible abnormalities. 
In particular, I want to examine a) whether those norms are 
morally troubling in ways similar to the norms of appearance 
that drive the cosmetic surgery industry; and b) how we might 
distinguish between internalized oppression and autonomous 
choice in accordance with mainstream values.
